Out of Pocket: FOX in the NFL House

Article: “The Great NFL Heist: How Fox Paid for and Changed Football Forever” Author: Bryan Curtis
Publication Date: December 13, 2018

As a 36-year-old football fan, I remember life before the NFC went to FOX. This is one of the many things that places me amongst the Xennial generation. There are things we have come to take for granted that didn’t exist prior to FOX getting the NFL package. One of the most jarring of those is noticed when you watch a classic sporting event in 1993 or earlier and notice that there are long stretches of gameplay where the score isn’t displayed. That innovation (brought over from SkySports) was known as FoxBox, and now we can’t live without it.

The story of how the NFL got to FOX like many things isn’t a simple story. Instead, it starts in steps, and who better to write an oral history about the process than the Ringer’s Bryan Curtis? This is a phenomenal read, and you’ll love it if you’re a media nerd (such as myself). I will highlight some of my favorite parts of this extensive piece.

What happened in 1993 was that the old-line networks were coming under increasing pressure. All three were run by cost-cutters: ABC by Capital Cities, NBC by General Electric, and CBS by theater mogul Larry Tisch. After the 1990–91 recession, the cost-cutters complained, almost in union, that their NFL deals were leaving them in the red. “No way I am going to lose money on the NFL,” Tisch thundered.

Under its previous deal, CBS had paid $265 million a year for the NFC. The network calculated that it could break even if it paid the NFL $250 million a year. So Tisch did something audacious: He told his executives to offer the NFL no more than that figure, which amounted to a $15 million pay cut. Neal Pilson, the president of CBS Sports, was in a bind: How could he appease his boss and keep the rights to the NFC?

One of the worst kept secrets in media is that television networks lose money on rights deals for major sports and sporting events. So why pay? These events tend to be rated highly and can be plugged full of advertisement for the given network’s weekly programming. When the NFL isn’t on the air “NBC, CBS, and Fox’s viewership is 45% lower among men ages 18 to 49, a coveted demographic for advertisers.” So despite this cost, it becomes a deal that these networks have to engage in. They can hope to get some money back through advertising but that is limited.

So let’s flashback to 1993. Each time contracts were up, the NFL practically had three networks bidding on their own individual deals. ABC had Monday Night Football, NBC had the AFC slate of games, and CBS had the NFC. Cable television wasn’t what it is today, and CBS didn’t feel like it should keep paying $265 million. This is a bold move especially when they held the more valuable package. The NFC package (at the time) had Dallas, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Chicago, and Los Angeles amongst other major markets. So how could this go wrong?

To put it simply, Fox came in with a pitch that focused on how they could present the game. David Hill (head of Sky Sports) came in explaining how they would give the NFL more cameras, more sound, and an exciting presentation that would be promoted year-round. Despite all of these things, the NFL didn’t exactly want to work with Fox. Much of the reason was that Fox wasn’t what it is today:

Preston Padden, Fox Broadcasting president of network distribution: There were about 60 cities in the United States where there was no fourth TV station to become our affiliate. CBS was saying to the NFL, “If you move these rights to Fox, in these 60 cities there will be no free over-the-air broadcast of the NFL.” Mr. Murdoch said, “You got to come to this meeting with the NFL TV committee.” Mr. (Rupert) Murdoch did not tell me what he was going to say. We stand up in front of the TV committee, and he says, “Within 60 days, Preston will get a secondary affiliation with some TV station in every one of these 60 markets.” I just about wet my pants.

Where CBS, ABC, and NBC had existed for decades Fox had only existed for a handful of years. It wasn’t available everywhere, but what it lacked in coverage it made up for with creativity and Rupert Murdoch’s (seemingly bottomless) pockets. CBS believed they had the latitude to call shots with the NFL, and Murdoch saw landing the NFL as tantamount to buying a network. He was such a visionary that he saw that acquiring the NFC rights would legitimize Fox overnight.

There is a suspenseful package that details how a CBS exec attempted to get the bid up to (then) NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue’s asking price of $295 million. When CBS that number, the exec runs to tell the NFL the news only to find out that Fox bid $395 million. The number was told to CBS head Larry Tisch and he refused to match. This marked a huge change in the climate of sports rights as explained by Steve Bornstein:

Steve Bornstein, ESPN president: When the league took that package from CBS and Tisch and sent it to Rupert and Chase at Fox, it changed the dynamic for the next 30 years. In the past, all the content that you were buying from the NFL or the NBA or Major League Baseball, the broadcaster had to maintain a profit on it. Now, you could rationalize that that’s how you build a network and get attention.

Realizing how big of a blow this was CBS tried to get a reel together to present the NFL to get the AFC package from NBC. What they learned was not only did NBC sign a $217 million deal that sealed them the rights to the AFC they would also get two Super Bowls over the duration of the deal.

Tagliabue: CBS came back the next day and said, “We’d like to go after the AFC package.” I had to tell them, “If you’re the loser on the first round, you don’t have a second round, even if we think we can get more in a second round. We’re not going to do that.” That was explicitly understood by both networks.

Just like that, it was over for CBS’ almost 40-year relationship with the NFL. What had to make it leave a sourer taste in their mouths is that this was all of their own doing. The NFL didn’t really want to move to Fox, but CBS overplayed their hand not realizing how eager Fox was to land the league. CBS didn’t stay out of the game long though as they went to outbid NBC for the ABC rights the next time the TV contracts were up.

The process of how the NFL landed on Fox is what interested me the most, but the entire article is fascinating. It gives a behind the scenes look on how the Fox courted John Madden, put together its studio show, and approached filling the rest of their announce teams. There are also insights from Jerry Jones who (along with Pat Bowlen) were the new power brokers who worked with Paul Tagliabue to not be so accommodating to the networks.

What we know is the relationship between Fox and NFL has been a mutually beneficial one. Fox became a legitimate network and has allowed Rupert Murdoch to extend his influence to start other networks (including Fox News). With the help of the Fox deal not only were the owners made richer, but so were the players. The NFL became a year-round product in a way that no other domestic sports league is.

What makes this article so important is that we are on the precipice of what could be another great change in sports broadcasting deals. In the past four years, the NFL has tested the waters by having games be streamed via Yahoo!, Twitter, and now Amazon Prime Video. Similar to how the broadcasts giants didn’t think the NFL would consider Fox, there is the thought that they wouldn’t risk taking their programming off of TV to go streaming. The NFL will go where the money is, but how long will networks have the money to stay in the game? That is the question we will have to wait to see the answer.

Out of Pocket: The Underrepresentation of the Working-class in Politics

Article: Working-class people are underrepresented in politics. The problem isn’t voters.
Author: Dr. Nicholas Carnes
Publication Date: October 24, 2018

It’s been a while so I’ll quickly explain the premise. Since 2012, I’ve been saving articles to Pocket to read later. The number of articles I saved outpaced the number of articles I could read, and eventually, I stopped reading (but didn’t stop saving). In this space, I highlight an article that interested me. Now with that out of the way… giddyup.

I remember in the run-up to the 2008 election, Barack Obama said that if he didn’t win and become President he would never run again. He believed he would be too far removed from the people to truly be able to represent them, and his connection to people was his entire reason for running. But that makes how much are politicians truly connected to the average American? This is something that Dr. Nicholas Carnes jumps into on his article “Working-class people are underrepresented in politics. The problem isn’t voters.”:

This year, it might be tempting to think that working-class Americans don’t have it so bad in politics, especially in light of recent candidates like Randy Bryce, the Wisconsin ironworker running for the US House seat Paul Ryan is vacating, or Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the former restaurant server whose primary election win over Democratic heavyweight Joe Crowley may go down as the single biggest election upset in 2018.

In reality, however, they are stark exceptions to a longstanding rule in American politics: Working-class people almost never become politicians. Ocasio-Cortez and Bryce make headlines in part because their economic backgrounds are so unusual (for politicians, that is). Their wins are stunning in part because their campaigns upset a sort of natural order in American politics.

He follows this up with a graphic that shows how “workers make up half over half US citizens but less than a tenth of US elected officials.” I always thought of people in politics as wealthy, but put in such plain terms this was still jarring. It’s not just that they aren’t working class, but only 2% of the pre-congressional career of the average congressperson is spent working a regular job. To compound that no one from the working class (or below) has gone on to become a member of the Supreme Court, a governor, or the President of the United States. With these facts laid out how representative can the government be? According to Carnes, not very. 

In the first major survey of US House members in 1958, members from the working class were more likely to report holding progressive views on the economic issues of the day and more likely to vote that way on actual bills. The same kinds of social class gaps appear in data on how members of Congress voted from the 1950s to the present. And in data on the kinds of bills they introduced from the 1970s to the present. And in public surveys of the views and opinions of candidates in recent elections.

….

Social class divisions even span the two parties. Among Democratic and Republican members of Congress alike, those from working-class jobs are more likely than their fellow partisans to take progressive or pro-worker positions on major economic issues.

States with fewer legislators from the working class spend billions less on social welfare each year, offer less generous unemployment benefits, and tax corporations at lower rates.

There is an assumption white-collar people are more qualified to be politicians by virtue of being white-collar. This status supposedly gives them the ability to handle the tasks they would be required to take care of while in office. The working-class person, on the other hand, is too ordinary and unable to navigate these waters. But what if they got the chance?

When working-class people hold office, they tend to perform about as well as other leaders on objective measures; in an analysis of cities governed by majority-working-class city councils in 1996, I found that by 2001, those cities were indistinguishable from others in terms of how their debt, population, and education spending had changed.

Dr. Carnes’ study reveals that the reason we don’t have more working-class politicians is that they don’t run. The reason is a bit of a catch-22. To get more working-class people to run for office they have to take time off from work to campaign, but by virtue of their being working-class, it’s harder to take the necessary time off of work. It is a great sacrifice for anyone, but even more for someone who doesn’t have the means to take the time off. As a result, someone who in theory makes a good candidate is disqualified by their class.

So what happens? We according to Carnes we get more of the same as “people who recruit new candidates often don’t see workers as viable options and pass them over in favor of white-collar candidates.” So, as a result, the people who get into offense tend to fight the same issues in the same way. Carnes suggests that the best way to combat the wealthy’s influence on politics is by giving the working-class a voice inside of government. Such a move would allow people to make decisions based on their own experiences instead of having a proxy. He points to a potential solution:

the New Jersey AFL-CIO has been running a program to recruit working-class candidates for more than two decades (and their graduates have a 75 percent win rate and close to 1,000 electoral victories). But the model has been slow to catch on in the larger pro-worker reform community.

He points out that the pro-worker reform community would rather focus on how the working-class can impact things from outside. The cynic in me says it is to protect themselves, and their control. If you have a system where the working-class are excluded and their only hope is to pick a self-appointed protector, why change? The easy conclusion to come to after reading the piece is that this exclusion of the working-class, as presented by Carnes, isn’t a flaw but a strong feature that dates back to the beginnings of this country.

This is an important issue for our nation going forward as the middle class continues to shrink, and the divide between the haves and have-nots grows. Where millennials make less money than previous generations while everything is more expensive. How long can things go the direction they’re going now? 

Out of Pocket: Facebook’s War on Free Will

Over the past five years, I have saved hundreds of long-form articles using Pocket.

My intent was to save articles I didn’t have time to read in the moment. As time passed my eyes were bigger than my attention span. The problem with that is there is SO MUCH GREAT LONG-FORM WRITING out there.

Seriously. If you are on any social media platform you will be exposed to at least 10 truly great articles. These are just the articles that people in your network shared. Believe it or not, there is a wide world outside of that. So over these five years, I have found myself saving everything. As a result, I have hundreds of articles saved that are begging to be read. So I’m going to read them in random order.

The first article is Franklin Foer’s Guardian piece from September 19, 2017, called “Facebook’s war on free will.” To sum up the article I’ll paraphrase Kanye West “No one (corporation) should have all that power.”

So what power does Facebook have? Well, it all lies in the algorithm. We’ve all heard the word before but Foer explains it’s utilization:

The essence of the algorithm is entirely uncomplicated. The textbooks compare them to recipes – a series of precise steps that can be followed mindlessly. This is different from equations, which have one correct result. Algorithms merely capture the process for solving a problem and say nothing about where those steps ultimately lead.

These recipes are the crucial building blocks of software. Programmers can’t simply order a computer to, say, search the internet. They must give the computer a set of specific instructions for accomplishing that task. These instructions must take the messy human activity of looking for information and transpose that into an orderly process that can be expressed in code. First do this … then do that. The process of translation, from concept to procedure to code, is inherently reductive. Complex processes must be subdivided into a series of binary choices. There’s no equation to suggest a dress to wear, but an algorithm could easily be written for that – it will work its way through a series of either/or questions (morning or night, winter or summer, sun or rain), with each choice pushing to the next.

In short, algorithms are one of many steps that will lead us to the singularity. When you log-on you are surrounded by them. They recommend you a TV show on Netflix, a song or album you might like on Spotify, an item you might be interested in buying on Amazon, and that isn’t scratching the surface. Algorithms are capable of doing things that a room full of the brightest minds on Earth can’t even comprehend. Foer continues:

Algorithms can translate languages without understanding words, simply by uncovering the patterns that undergird the construction of sentences. They can find coincidences that humans might never even think to seek. Walmart’s algorithms found that people desperately buy strawberry Pop-Tarts as they prepare for massive storms.

So what does this have to do with Facebook? Everything.

Over a billion people have Facebook accounts. More people than you would like to admit use Facebook as a one-stop shop for socializing, news, entertainment, and memes. While you get all of this information on your timeline it isn’t by chance that they end up there. It is, you guessed it, algorithms that suggest posts and point you in the direction of news that reflects your mindstate. It was this very situation that allowed Facebook to be exploited during the last Presidential election.

If it were only the news that you received, videos you played, or memes you saw that would be bad enough. Instead, Facebook’s power is exposed by them using their super large user base which allows them to run experiments.

Facebook sought to discover whether emotions are contagious. To conduct this trial, Facebook attempted to manipulate the mental state of its users. For one group, Facebook excised the positive words from the posts in the news feed; for another group, it removed the negative words. Each group, it concluded, wrote posts that echoed the mood of the posts it had reworded. This study was roundly condemned as invasive, but it is not so unusual. As one member of Facebook’s data science team confessed: “Anyone on that team could run a test. They’re always trying to alter people’s behaviour.”

If this was a thought experiment that would be one thing. The fact this was an actual experiment that they tested on people is scary. What’s even scarier is no oneknew, besides the people running the experiment, it was taking place. If someone suggested this type of abuse of power was possible a few years ago they would have been accused of being a conspiracy theorist.

The ability to control that many people through a suggestion is dangerous. One could argue the positives in nudging people away from negative behaviors subconsciously. I would say that it involves impeding on someone’s free will, and it is a slippery slope that is destined to lead to abuses.

The many Facebook experiments add up. The company believes that it has unlocked social psychology and acquired a deeper understanding of its users than they possess of themselves. Facebook can predict users’ race, sexual orientation, relationship status and drug use on the basis of their “likes” alone. It’s Zuckerberg’s fantasy that this data might be analysed to uncover the mother of all revelations, “a fundamental mathematical law underlying human social relationships that governs the balance of who and what we all care about”.

When you consider all the information we willingly give Facebook. Through each status, each image, each comment we give a little bit more of ourselves. That is not enough for Facebook. It is not for any altruistic goal, but to control us to point us in a direction that benefits them the most. They strive to know us better than we know ourselves by keeping track of our likes, what we view, and more. It’s all enough to make me wish I could give it all away, but it might be too late for all of us.